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 CHAPTER 4 
 Does Secularism Face a Serious 
Threat in Turkey? 
 Metin  Heper 
 Introduction 
 In two interviews conducted in May 2007, prominent Turkish social scien-
tist Şerif Mardin suggested that if the conditions one day become conducive 
for it, the bigots in his country may exert an effective communal pressure 
on the secularly oriented to adopt certain Islamic life styles and the secularly 
oriented may find it difficult not to act in conformity with the set of norms 
imposed on them. 1 
 Mardin added that such a development may take place independently 
of the governing Justice and Development Party (JDP), which, accord-
ing to some, has always had the hidden agenda of bringing back a state 
based on Islam and, which, according to others, is not a political party 
that cherishes political Islam. 2 According to proponents of the latter view, 
the JDP is led by people who in their private lives act as devout Muslims 
but in their public lives pursue secular policies. 3 Mardin, who is inclined 
toward the second view, thinks that the JDP would be no match for the 
bigots if a competition were to take place between the two on reshaping 
lifestyles in society. 4 
 Mardin has not committed himself one way or another on the question 
of to what extent the emergence of communally based Islamic fundamental-
ism is likely in Turkey, if at all. He merely pointed out that in the past the 
phenomenon of Islamic communal pressure on those who seemed not as 
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devout as the bigots themselves had been a fact of life and thus implied that 
it might again be the case. Mardin further pointed out that the conditions 
conducive for the revival of the communal Islamic pressure in question, as 
well as the very nature of that pressure, has remained an enigma, and that 
it was high time that social scientists try to make heads or tails of both 
phenomena. 5 
 The question Mardin raised in May 2007 continues to have significance 
for Turkish modernization in general, and democracy in that country in 
particular. Between December 2007 and July 2008, another prominent 
Turkish scholar, Binnaz Toprak, along with three journalists, carried out 
in- depth interviews with 401 persons in 13 provinces, including Istanbul. 
In this nonrepresentative study, Toprak and other researchers explored the 
manner in which Islamists keep the secularists under pressure. 6 
 What Mardin has thought probable and what Toprak and others have 
given examples of is that the threat the secularists face in Turkey contin-
ues to be a very contentious issue. This chapter suggests that the cognitive 
revolution that the founders of the Turkish Republic tried to make has been 
quite successful and as a result: (1) the Turkish people, the pious as well as 
nonreligious, have come to have loyalty to the secular republic; (2) on the 
whole the pious are secularized and voluntarily separate religion and poli-
tics; and, consequently, (3) the loyalties of the pious to the secular state do 
not contradict their religiosity. 
 The Cognitive Revolution 
 Following the inception of the republic in 1923, the founding fathers led 
by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) attempted at a cognitive revolution. 7 The new 
Turk was no longer going turn to the Book, but would use his or her own 
reasoning faculties to make important decisions. To accomplish this goal, 
among other things, the caliphate was abolished; the provision that Islam 
was the religion of the state was removed from the (1924) constitution; reli-
gious schools and orders were closed; the Arabic scripture was replaced by the 
Latin one; Sunday, not Friday, was rendered the day of the rest; the Islamic 
lunar calendar was replaced by Gregorian calendar; and men were obliged to 
wear the Western- style hat in place of the fez, which at the time was assumed 
to be a symbol of Islam. 8 Most significant, people had to submit to a system 
of education couched in the scientific terms of the West. 9 In Atatürk’s view, 
what he and his associates were trying to institutionalize in Turkey was a 
technique of how to think, not a prescription of what to think. 10 
 The founders must have hoped that the cognitive revolution they were 
trying to bring about would in time lead to a cultural revolution. This was 
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particularly the case in respect to women’s dress; Atatürk criticized women 
who sported the Iranian chador like  çarşaf but did not force them to dress in 
a particular style. The founders’ conception of modernization was in effect 
Westernization, an integral dimension of which was democratization. The 
transition to democracy was also accomplished, though relatively late in the 
game (1945). 
 On the whole, the above project of the founding fathers, later referred 
to as Kemalism, had been a successful project, for several reasons. First, 
an overwhelming majority of the people in Turkey began to move away 
from superstitions and a dogmatic way of thinking. In 1964, for villagers, 
a nearby town or even a city was no longer “a conglomerate of humanity 
profaned by infidels.” 11 In 1996, in the central Anatolian city of Konya, 
which had been one of the most religiously conservative cities in Turkey, an 
English- medium school that also offered an intensive religious instruction 
attracted good students because of its medium of instruction, not because of 
its emphasis on religious topics. 12 Second, people began to see themselves as 
part of a secular nation and not as part of a religious community, as had been 
the case in the Ottoman times. In the late 1960s workers in a textile factory 
in the western city of İzmir (Smyrna) were asked to identify themselves, and 
while 37.5 percent considered themselves as “Muslims,” 50.3 percent said 
they were “Turks,” and the rest referred to themselves with other identities. 13 
In a nationwide survey conducted in 1994, when asked how they consid-
ered themselves, 69 percent responded that they were “Turks,” 21 percent 
“Muslim Turks,” 4 percent “Muslims,” another four percent “Kurds,” and 
2 percent another identity. 14 A third reason for Kemalism’s success is that 
democracy came to be consolidated in Turkey; no significant section of the 
populace thinks an authoritarian political regime is better than democracy. 
It is true that the military in Turkey intervened several times, in 1960, 1971, 
and 1980, taking power into its hands and in 1997, in concert with some 
civil societal groups, obliging a coalition government to resign. However, 
except for a faction among those who intervened in the 1960, officers have 
never toyed with the idea of staying in power for good, as their counter-
parts in South America and in the other Middle Eastern countries have 
often done. Officers have always intervened with the sole purpose of “saving 
democracy from itself” and returned to the barracks when they thought that 
that mission was accomplished. 
 Why Are the Secularists Concerned? 
 From the early republican times to the present, certain Islamic developments 
or discourses rendered the secularists in Turkey very much concerned about 
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the possibility of some retrogressive groups succeeding to form a state based 
on Islam. 15 To give a few examples, the Progressive Republican Party formed 
in 1924 was against some of the Kemalist reforms that were in the making. 
The party was closed by the government the next year. The leaders of the 
Kurdish rebellions in 1921–1938 tried to mobilize people by arguing that 
Islam was under threat. The Republican Free Party of 1930 was consid-
ered to have opened up a political space for the antirepublican tendencies 
in the country, and consequently its leader was “persuaded” to close the 
party. That same year a young officer was beheaded in the western town 
of Menemen in a mini- rebellion orchestrated by the Nakshibandi religious 
order. In the 1950s the so- called Ticani religious order smashed statues of 
Atatürk. From 1969 onward, religiously oriented political parties began to 
compete in national elections. Although in later decades their discourse 
became one of “neither the state nor religion should interfere in the affairs of 
the other,” initially these political parties perceived an essential contradic-
tion between Islam and secularism. On July 30, 1980 the leader of the first 
four of these political parties, Necmettin Erbakan, made the following dec-
laration at a rally of Islamists, where placards proclaimed “Sharia or death” 
and “One caliphate, one state”: “We should take as our guide the industry, 
determination, and love of  jihad [that resulted] in the conquest of Istanbul. 
May you, the new army of the Sultan Fatih Mehmet, be victorious and your 
holy struggle be blessed. Be prepared, we shall sharpen our swords.” 16 
 All of the four religiously oriented political parties were closed, three of 
them by the Constitutional Court and one in the aftermath of the 1980 mil-
itary intervention. In the late 1990s the Turkish Hezbollah, a small Islamic 
movement community, aimed at creating a pristine Islamic state, if neces-
sary by killing the “unbelievers.” The movement was neutralized in 2000. 
 In the wake of the November 2002 and July 2007 national elections, 
the “religiously oriented” JDP garnered adequate seats in Parliament and 
formed majority governments. Furthermore, following the 2007 national 
elections, the JDP has elected in Parliament one of its members as the presi-
dent of the republic. These two developments together constituted the last 
straw: the secularists became alarmed. Despite the JDP leaders’ insistence 
that, although devout persons, they preferred secular politics (and acted 
accordingly), the secularists expected the worse. The latter, in particular, 
thought that the JDP was going to allow covered women to attend colleges 
and work in the public bureaucracy. They were also of the opinion that the 
government may enforce Islamic dress codes for secularist women and that, 
even if that were not the case, the mere increase in the numbers of covered 
women would create enough pressure on secularist women that they would 
feel obliged to sport the turban. 17 
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 The interviews with Mardin were conducted two months before the 
2007 national elections. During the almost five years that followed the 2002 
elections, the secularists had already become very much concerned about the 
future of the secular republic. Mardin’s remarks plus the 2007 elections, at 
which the JDP increased its vote percentage from 34.2 to 46.6, added fuel 
to the fire. The election of a JDP member to the presidency of the republic 
was another reason for the secularists’ alarm, because the presidency in the 
Turkish political system, along with the Constitutional Court, has some 
significant powers over Parliament. 18 The previous president of the republic 
who had sympathies with the secularists, did use some of those powers for 
preventing the JDP government from “setting up a state based on Islam.” 
 Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey? 
 Is the flourishing of a communally based Islamic fundamentalism a likely 
prospect in Turkey, as Mardin suggested in 2007 as a possibility and as 
Toprak and others have found some examples of? More specifically, are 
people in Turkey inclined to exert pressure on others to practice or not prac-
tice their religion and/or lead or not lead certain lifestyles? On the strength 
of a number of reliable nationwide surveys, including one by Toprak and 
another by prominent Turkish scientist Ali Çarkoğlu, I argue that that the 
answers to both questions should be in the negative. 
 Most people in Turkey are sympathetic toward both the secular republic 
and Islam. A 2006 nationwide survey found that 85.9 percent of respon-
dents think that, in leading a modern lifestyle, the president of the republic 
should be a role model for the people, and 75.2 percent were of the opinion 
that the president should act as the guardian of secularism. However, 74.3 
percent of the same set of respondents also indicated that the president of 
the republic should be a practicing Muslim. 19 The same survey found that 
when people vote, they act in a similar manner: 84.2 percent have pointed 
out that they vote for political parties that, they think, have internalized 
secular republican values, and 78.2 percent wish to see that the same politi-
cal parties respect their Islamic values and sentiments and pursue policies 
along those lines. 20 
 That people think that Turkey should be a secular republic and at the 
same time wish that political parties would act responsively to their reli-
gious preferences and sentiments should not be seen as a paradox. The great 
majority of people in Turkey are practicing Muslims. Islam for them is on 
the one hand a system of belief and on the other a source of ethics, values, 
and attitudes. Religion (Islam) has continued to shape the cultural makeup 
of an overwhelming majority of Turks. This is because the Turks have not 
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had either a hegemonic aristocracy or a bourgeoisie, and therefore have not 
emulated those values and attitudes. Kemalism, in the final analysis, was 
a cognitive revolution; it was not and could not be a cultural revolution. 
A great majority of the Turks learned to use their reasoning faculties. In 
the process, the leaders of the JDP turned out to be devout persons (not 
only in practicing their religion but also in deriving certain values from 
their religion), but they preferred running state affairs essentially in a secular 
manner. 21 
 In later decades, while a majority of people practiced their religion, on 
the whole they did not vote for a political party only because it was reli-
giously oriented. In the 1973 and 1977 national elections in Turkey, only 
one religiously oriented political party competed— the National Salvation 
Party (NSP). Like the decades that succeeded it, the 1970s were considered a 
period when Islam was on the rise both in Turkey and around the world. Yet 
while in the 1973 national elections the NSP garnered 11.8 percent of the 
vote, its vote percentage dropped to 8.6 in the 1977 elections. In the 1990s, 
the only religiously oriented party was the Welfare Party (WP). It obtained 
16.8 percent of the votes in the 1991 national elections. In the 1994 local 
elections, the WP captured the metropolitan mayoralties in several urban 
centers, including some major ones. The mayors of the WP performed well, 
one being Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Istanbul metropolitan municipal-
ity. It was for this reason in particular that in the 1995 national elections, 
the WP’s vote percentage increased from 16.8 to 21.4 (a plurality of votes). 
The party became the senior member of the coalition government that it 
managed to form with a secularly oriented party (the True Path Party), and 
whose leader, Erbakan, became prime minister. In 2002 and 2007 two reli-
giously oriented political parties participated in the national elections— the 
Felicity Party (FP) and the JDP. The FP presented itself as basically reli-
giously oriented party and its program did not hide this fact. In contrast, 
the JDP pronounced itself a “conservative- democratic” party, and while in 
government from 2002 to the present it essentially acted as such. In the 
2002 and 2007 national elections, the FP obtained only 2.49 percent and 
2.33 percent of the votes, respectively, whereas the JDP in those elections 
received 34.43 percent and 46.66 percent of the vote, respectively. 
 Hard- core Kemalists fearful of “fundamentalist Islam” are not tolerant 
toward those they consider adherents of this form of Islam. However, most 
Turks as Muslims display loyalty to the secular republic; they are inclined 
not to mix religion and politics, and they are tolerant toward other peo-
ple on religious matters. These particular traits on the part of most Turks 
result from a number of factors. As compared to other Muslim states, the 
Ottoman state was the least theocratic; from the fifteenth century onward, 
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laws based solely on sultan’s decree took their places alongside the sharia. 
The Ottoman society itself was a mosaic of peoples who lived side by side 
and, consequently, experienced a certain degree of mutual acculturation. 
Having learned to live together in relative harmony, they developed toler-
ance as acceptance. In Ottoman times, this particular attitude in matters of 
religion was often expressed as, “Your religion to you, my religion to me.” 22 
 This particular Ottoman heritage of the modern- day Turks is reflected 
in their tendency to regard those who are different as odd and thus as the 
“other.” Nationwide surveys conducted in 1999 and 2006 found that a per-
son who believes in Allah (the Muslims’ God) and his Prophet Muhammad 
is considered Muslim by 84.8 percent and 79.9 percent of the respondents, 
respectively, even if that person does not do his or her prayers. 23 The same 
survey found that 75.2 percent of respondents did not object to having 
neighbors who had a different sectarian preference. 24 The findings of a 2006 
nationwide survey summed up the tolerant attitude of the Turks as Muslims 
toward other Muslims in an unequivocal manner: only 8.2 percent of the 
respondents opposed the view that people have the right to practice their 
religion in a manner they see fit. 25 
 What are the attitudes of people in Turkey toward the question of  tesettür 
(women covering themselves)? Before I take up this issue, an indication of 
the types of covering in Turkey, of those that are matters of contention and 
those that are not, and why, is in order. In Turkey, the scarves that women 
use to cover their head are the  çarşaf , headscarf, turban, and  yeldirme. The 
 çarşaf , similar to the chador in Iran, is a cloak made up of black light cloth 
that completely, but loosely, covers the whole body, including the hair and 
neck but excluding feet, hands, and face (and in Turkey in rare cases only 
eyes). The secularists view the  çarşaf as an Islamic outfit and not a modern 
one, and consequently they are dead set against it. However, since women 
wearing the  çarşaf often stay out of the neighborhoods where most of the 
secularists reside, work, and otherwise are present this outfit is less contro-
versial than the turban. The headscarf ( başörtüsü/eşarp/yemeni ) covers part 
of the hair and sometimes also part of the shoulders, is tied loosely under-
neath the chin, is usually of pale color, and is worn by older women. Young 
secularists stay away from it; however, it is not made a matter of contention 
by the secularists in general. The turban covers all hair, the neck, and some-
times the shoulders, too. The secularists take this type of cover as a symbol 
of political Islam and are opposed to turbaned women (as well as those wear-
ing the  çarşaf  ) entering the “public sphere”; the debate in Turkey among 
the secularists and their detractors on the question of what constitutes the 
public sphere is ongoing. This version of the turban is distinguished from 
the  eşarp in Turkish, a type of turban often of a bright color that is tied at the 
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back of the neck and does not cover the shoulders, the neck, and all of the 
hair. This version of turban is worn by some secularist women. The  yemeni , 
a kind of light cloak often sported by women in small towns and villages, is 
hardly mentioned in the debates on the covering of women. 
 It should be underlined here that, in contrast to both the secularists and 
their detractors, ordinary people in Turkey do not perceive the question 
of the headscarf/turban as an important problem. In a nationwide survey 
carried out in 2006, less than one percent of respondents considered “reli-
gion or religious practices” a problem for the country. 26 Similarly, in another 
nationwide survey conducted that same year, only 3.7 percent of respon-
dents perceived the headscarf/turban issue as problematic. 27 
 That most Turks do not consider the turban problematic must be a con-
sequence of their tendency to stay away from political Islam. This issue was 
investigated in the 1986, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2006 nation-
wide surveys, whose findings are given in table  4.1. 
 From the surveys’ results, one might ask how a claim that the Turks stay 
away from political Islam can be made when respondents, ranging from one-
 forth in 1996 to one- fifth in 1995, 1998, and 1999 and close to  one- fifth 
in 2002, came up with affirmative answers when asked whether or not 
 Table 4.1  Do people in Turkey long for a state based on Islam? 
 Years  Affirmative Responses (%) 
 1986*  0.7 
 1995**  19.9 
 1996**  26.7 
 1998**  19.8 
 1999***  21.0 
 2002****  16.4 
 2006***  8.9 
 Sources: 
 * Nokta , October 19, 1986, cited in İlter Turan, “Religion and Political 
Culture in Turkey,” in  Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and 
Literature in a Secular State , ed. Richard Tapper (London: I. B. Tauris, 
1991), 55, footnote 42. 
 **Türkiye Sosyal, Ekonomik ve Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfi (Social, 
Economic, and Political Studies Foundation of Turkey),  Türkiye’ de 
siyasi partilerin seçmenleri ve sosyal demokrasinin toplumsal tabanı (The 
Electorate of Political Parties and Social Base of Social Democracy in 
Turkey) (Ankara, 1996). 
 ***Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak,  Değişen Türkiye’ de din, toplum 
ve siyaset ( Religion, Society, and Politics in Changing Turkey ) (Istanbul: 
TESEV, 1999). 
 **** Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu,  Turkish Democracy Today. 
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they long for a state based on Islam. One may arrive at the conclusion that 
the Turks stay away from political Islam for a number of reasons. First, as 
already noted, for people in Turkey, religion and religious issues in general 
and the headscarf/turban issue in particular are not significant concerns. If 
this is indeed the case, then why would one- fourth to one- fifth of people 
toy with the idea of a quantum jump from a secular system of government 
to an Islamic one? Second, when respondents were asked whether they long 
for a state based on religion, that is, on the sharia, their answers implied 
that on the whole they do not have a clear idea of what sharia rule would 
be like. Turkey’s prominent social scientists Çarkoğlu, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 
and Toprak have also arrived at this conclusion. According to Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu, “Such findings suggest that approval of Şeriat [sharia] rule may 
simply be a proxy for reactions reflective of economic and political unease in 
the country rather than being a radical turn toward religion based on legal 
and political order in the country.” 28 Toprak is also of the opinion that the 
affirmative responses to the question of whether people long for a sharia 
state would not by themselves indicate that the respondents have in mind 
what a sharia state would entail. 29 
 As table  4.1. illustrates, in the 1999 survey carried out by Çarkoğlu and 
Toprak, 21 percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative when 
asked whether they preferred a state based on Islam to the one based on 
secularism. Taking this finding at face value could create shock waves in a 
country that underwent quite a successful cognitive revolution. However, 
responses to some other related questions in the same survey make it clear 
that to the participants the term “sharia state” indeed connotes a mean-
ing different from what sharia rule really implies. Among other things, the 
sharia allows men to marry up to four wives and stipulates the stoning to 
death of women who commit adultery. When the respondents were asked 
whether men should be allowed to marry up to four wives, the affirmative 
response rate dropped from 21 percent to 7 percent, and when they were 
asked whether women who commit adultery should be stoned to death, the 
affirmative response rate plummeted to less than 2 percent. 
 It seems that approximately one- fifth of the people in Turkey long for 
a better life than the one they have; by their admission, such a life may 
be possible under a state different from the present one; and they refer to 
that different state as a sharia state. Since 2002 Turkey has been ruled by a 
conservative- democratic government. In the 2006 survey, those who long 
for a sharia state dropped from 21 percent to 9 percent. Could there be a 
relationship between the two phenomena? To judge the validity of such a 
hypothesis additional empirical data would be needed. 
 As noted above, particularly from 2002 to the present (the years the JDP 
has been in government), the covering issue has become a matter of bitter 
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confrontation between the JDP and the secularists. The secularists took the 
turban in particular as a symbol of a movement against the secular premises 
of the republic. Also, they opposed the  çarşaf even more fervently; however, 
since the women wearing the  çarşaf are less in the public eye, the conflict 
has revolved primarily around the turban. In a related manner, the secu-
larists have also concluded that the number of women wearing turbans is 
increasing by the day and this could soon place moral pressure on uncovered 
women to cover themselves. 
 How widespread is covering among women in Turkey? What are the 
coverings most used in that country? Do more people cover as time goes by? 
The 1999 and 2006 surveys have investigated these questions (see table  4.2 ). 
As the findings show, in 1999, 19.1 percent of women respondents wore the 
turban or  çarşaf. In 2006 the number dropped to 12.5 percent. 
 An even more important question here is why women in Turkey cover 
themselves. Do they do so for the reasons that alarm the secularists in that 
country or for other reasons? The results of the 2006 Çarkoğlu- Toprak survey 
are presented in table  4.3. As the findings show, religious belief is the major 
reason women cover themselves. There is no reason, however, to jump to the 
conclusion that those women who cover themselves because of their religious 
belief would also champion religious fundamentalism at the level(s) of the 
community and/or political Islam. If that were the case, in the 2002 and 
2007 national elections, the FP, openly religiously oriented party, would have 
received more votes and the JDP, a conservative- democratic party, would have 
garnered fewer. More significant, as is well known, religion may play a role at 
the individual, community, and/or state level. At the individual level, it is a 
source for ethics and morality. At the community level, it may be a road map 
for the individual in his or her interactions with other community members. 
At the level of state, religion turns into a political religion. If it plays a role at 
the individual level, it does not necessarily play a role at the community level 
and/or state level, as the secularists in Turkey tend to think. 
 Table 4.2  Women wearing the  çarşaf , headscarf, and turban (%) 
  1999  2006 
 No cover  27.3  36.5 
 Headscarf  58.4  48.8 
 Turban  15.7  11.4 
 Çarşaf  3.4  1.1 
 Note: The  yeldirme was not taken up in these surveys. 
 Source: Çarkoğlu and Toprak , Değişen Türkiye’ de din, toplum ve siyaset, 
1999, 2006. 
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 Furthermore, in 2006, those women who indicated that they cover 
because they consider themselves part of a political movement was only 0.4 
percent of the total population surveyed. It is difficult to determine what 
respondents mean when they say that they consider Islam as their identity. 
Nevertheless, when they are grouped with those who regard themselves as 
part of a political movement (i.e., political Islam), the percentage of the two 
categories together, among all the women interviewed, still remains low, at 
4.9 percent. 
 One should also keep in mind that the population of the 2006 survey 
comprised women who covered themselves not only with the turban but 
also with other headgear. This means that turbaned women who use it as a 
symbol of Islamic fundamentalism/political Islam constitute even smaller 
percentage than 0.4 percent or 4.9 percent, as the case may be, among all 
the women who covered themselves at the time the survey was conducted. 
 Another significant finding of the 2006 survey is that a great majority of 
the women in Turkey do not cover themselves because of pressure exerted on 
them by their close relatives or partners, another widespread assumption on the 
part of the secularists in Turkey. When women who covered were also asked 
what they would do if some covered women around them started uncovering, 
100 percent of  çarşaf wearers, 94.1 percent of those sporting turbans, and 87.7 
percent donning other headgear indicated that they themselves would not 
uncover. As already noted, the secularists fear that an increase in the number 
of the covered women could constitute a moral pressure on uncovered women 
and that they, too, would feel obliged to cover. This fear seems unreason-
able: if the covered women whom the secularists look down on can stand 
 Table 4.3  Why women in Turkey cover themselves (2006) 
  Reasons % 
 Religious belief  71.6 
 Because others too cover themselves  7.6 
 Expression of identity  3.9 
 Getting around in society more easily  1.2 
 Wish of one’s husband/fiancee  0.9 
 Being part of a political movement  0.4 
 Wish of one’s father, mother, and/or 
brother 
 0.2 
 Other  1.1 
 No response  8.2 
 Source: Çarkoğlu and Toprak,  Değişen Türkiye’ de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset , 
1999. 
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against the presumed moral pressure from others on this side, then why should 
the more “modern” and “rational” secularists could not manage to do the 
same if indeed they themselves faced such a pressure? 
 I turn back to the presumed turban- political Islam relationship in Turkey, 
on the basis of a 2007 nationwide survey that also investigated why women 
wear the turban and whose findings corroborate those of the 2006 survey 
on the same issue (see table  4.4 ). The 2007 survey results indicate that for 
women, sporting the turban serves specific functions such as displaying one’s 
political preference, expressing one’s morality, or being a means of gender-
 related self- protection from strangers. However, none of these additional 
functions can be considered in relation to political Islam; both the 2006 
and the 2007 surveys show that for those who wear the turban, it is first and 
foremost a symbol of belief in Islam, and for only a few turbaned women it 
is a symbol of political Islam. 
 Some relatively recent qualitative studies based on in- depth interviews 
also have arrived at the conclusion that there is no generalized relationship 
between turban/ çarşaf , and political Islam. These studies show that in many 
instances veiling, in fact, enables women to take advantage of the spaces 
modernity provides and thus to participate in economic, social, and political 
life, which they otherwise could not be a part of. 30 
 Conclusion 
 In his well- known  Foreign Affairs article in 1993, Samuel P. Huntington 
foresaw a clash of civilizations among the constellations of countries divided 
from one another in terms of religion, history, language, and traditions. In 
this context, Huntington regarded Turkey as a “torn country,” and catego-
rized it as a member of a civilization rival to the Western one. 31 
 Table 4.4  Why women in Turkey sport turbans 
  Reasons % 
 Conformity with Islam’s tenets  68.0 
 Displaying one’s political preference  14.9 
 Acting in harmony with others  7.4 
 Displaying one’s identity  4.6 
 Expression of one’s morality  3.1 
 A means of self- protection  2.1 
 Source : Tarhan Erdem, “Gündelik Yaşamda Din, Laiklik ve 
Türban” (“Religion, Secularism, and Turban in Everyday Life”), 
 Milliyet , December 3–4, 2007. 
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 In religious terms, Turkey is  not a torn country. For a great majority 
of its population, Islam plays a role only at the individual level, not at the 
community and state levels. And the same majority of people support and 
value the secular republic. Turks as Muslims have a great deal of tolerance 
toward their co- citizens’ ways of practicing or not practicing and living and 
not living according to their religion. The secularists should not be scared 
of becoming an increasingly smaller and weaker minority in an increasingly 
religious society, because those whom the secularists regard as Islamists, in 
fact, display a great deal of tolerance (with respect) toward those who are 
different from themselves and, they at the same time, show loyalty to the 
secularist republic. 
 Since Turkey has gone through a cognitive revolution, Islam for the bulk 
of the people is not a source of superstitions and dogmas. On the whole, 
political Islam has no appeal to Turks. They are also not receptive to a 
community- based political Islam. 
 If there have been deep divisions in Turkey, those rifts have been around 
some hard and soft ideologies and only among some members of the intelli-
gentsia. In recent years, the secularists have been rather hostile toward those 
people and politicians whom they consider retrogressive and who, in their 
opinion, would take Turkey back to the Dark Ages. In the process, they have 
held “republican demonstrations” and denounced “the retrogressives.” The 
latter, however, have not reciprocated. 
 With Turkey having had a democratic revolution, the secularists could 
not come to power via elections, because for years they have looked down 
on the majority of people and thus given short shrift to their preferences and 
demands. Yet, in November 2008, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the political 
party of the secularists (the Republican People’s Party, or the RPP), admit-
ted women with turbans and even  çarşaf s into his party, and the party was 
careful to publicize the event. 32 On the face of this “turn of events,” this 
chapter could have concluded as follows: if this sudden volte- face on the part 
of Baykal was not made only for the sake of the upcoming local elections 
(March 2009), Turkey may soon mend fences also with some members of 
its intelligentsia and politicians and thus begin to enjoy a more consensual 
politics. However, it would not be appropriate to arrive at such a conclusion. 
For only five days after admitting covered women into the RPP, the party’s 
vice chairman, Onur Öymen, was asked how the party could admit to its 
ranks women wearing turbans and  çarşaf s given the party’s strict secularist 
stance. Öymen countered with a telling question: “How could the chair-
man of the RPP turn its back to the women with turbans and  çarşaf s who 
had wished to join his party, indicating that they had become fed up with 
the Justice and Development Party, and begun to identify themselves with 
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the principles the RPP advocates?” He added that, once those people had 
joined the RPP, the republican women in the RPP would instruct them on 
the modern worldview. 33 True to the long- time approach of his party on 
this issue, secularist Öymen was not willing to meet with the “Islamists” at 
a consensual midpoint; instead, he was inclined to instruct them about the 
secularists’ “truth”. 
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